Final Position Arbitration and Intertemporal Compromise by Dworkin, James B.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Final Position Arbitration and Intertemporal Compromise"
 
James B. Dworkin
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 32, n° 2, 1977, p. 250-261.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/028786ar
DOI: 10.7202/028786ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 03:49
Final Position Arbitration and 
Intertemporal Compromise 
James B. Dworkin 
This paper seeks to présent further évidence from the 
realm of professional baseball in regard to Swimmer's criti-
cism of final offer procecure. 
Final position (offer) arbitration was originally proposed by Cari 
Stevens1 as a conceptually attractive alternative to conventional arbi-
tration. The latter process gives to the arbitrator the discrétion to mold 
the binding award he/she thinks to be best on the issue(s) at impasse. 
The former requires an arbitrator to sélect without change, one of the 
final positions of the parties. 
Conventional arbitration was initially hailed as a virtuous, almost 
idéal impasse resolution mechanism. Lately, however, it has been the 
subject of numerous criticisms, the most important one being that the 
mère availability of conventional arbitration will hâve a «chilling» 
effect on the bargaining process.2 This implies that the incentives of 
the negotiators to bargain in good faith will be « chilled » in anticipation 
of having the dispute settled at arbitration. Moreover, once arbitration 
has been used, it will be turned to 
again and again as an easy, habit 
forming release from the duties of 
responsible bargaining.3 
DWORKIN, J. B., Assistant Professor 
of Industrial Administration, Krannert 
Graduate School of Industrial Admi-
nistration, Purdue University, Lafayet-
te, Indiana. 
* The author wishes to thank John Baum for his helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
1
 Cari STEVENS, « Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?» 
Industrial Relations, V (February 1966), pp. 38-52. 
2
 For an excellent review of the useful and dysfunctional dimensions of 
conventional arbitration, see Peter FEUILLE, Final Offer Arbitration: Concepts, Devel-
opments, Techniques, Chicago, International Personnel Management Association, 1975, 
pp. 6-12. 
3
 Readers familiar with the literature will recognize the above as the classic 
statement of the «narcotic effect» of conventional compulsory arbitration on bargain-
ing, attributed to former United States Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz. See 
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The prolifération of such criticism of the «chilling» or «narcotic» 
effect of conventional arbitration led some scholars to conclude that 
arbitration and bargaining were incompatible.4 Final offer arbitration 
was suggested as the appropriate solution to the alleged detrimental 
effect(s) of conventional arbitration on bargaining. 
The final offer technique, according to Stevens, would overcome 
the pernicious effects of conventional arbitration as it was, 
«... a technique for imposing a cost of disagreement... to invoke the 
processes of concession and compromise which are an essential part of 
collective bargaining negotiations. »5 
As of late, several studies hâve purported to assess the viability of 
the final offer technique and/or to measure its impact on bargaining 
vis-à-vis the impact of conventional arbitration.6 On the whole, the 
reported results favor final offer arbitration as a procédure that is 
compatible with bargaining (Le., it acts as a self-destruct mechanism) 
and that does encourage the parties to narrow their areas of disagree-
ment so that the award of the arbitrator is necessarily a reasonable 
one. However, one should note that final offer arbitration is coming 
increasingly under review as having some defects of its own. For 
example, Feigenbaum concludes that while plausible in theory, final 
offer arbitration actually provides no greater positive inducement to 
the parties to negotiate in good faith than conventional interest arbi-
tration. Furthermore, final offer arbitration awards are significantly 
James L. STERN, «Final Offer Arbitration — Initial Expérience in Wisconsin,» 
Monthly Labor Review, XCVII, (September, 1974), pp. 39-43. 
4
 STEVENS, op. cit. pp. 38-52. Also see Herbert R. NORTHRUP, Compulsory 
Arbitration and Governement Intervention in Labor Disputes, Washington, D.C., Labor 
Policy Association, 1966, Chapters 11 and 12. 
5
 STEVENS, Ibid., p. 40. 
6
 See, for example, James B. DWORKIN, «The Impact of Final Offer Interest 
Arbitration on Bargaining: The Case of Major League Baseball,» Paper to be presented 
at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Winter Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Asso-
ciation, Atlantic City, New Jersey, September 16-18, 1976, pp. 1-15; Gary LONG and 
Peter FEUILLE «Final Offer Arbitration: 'Sudden Death' in Eugène,» Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, XXVII (January, 1974), pp. 186-203; James L. STERN, op. cit., 
pp. 39-43; James L. STERN, Charles M. REHMUS, J. Joseph LOEWENBERG, 
Hirschel KASPER and Barbara D. DENNIS, Final Offer Arbitration: The 
Effects on Public Safety Employée Bargaining, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington 
Books, 1975, 223 pp.; Charles M. REHMUS, «Is a 'Final Offer' Ever Final?» Monthly 
Labor Review, XCVII (September, 1974), pp. 43-45; Fred WITNEY, «Final Offer 
Arbitration: The Indianapolis Expérience,» Monthly Labor Review, XCVI (May, 1973), 
pp. 20-25. 
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worse than conventional arbitration awards.7 Many other similar defects 
are expounded by arbitrators themselves.8 
Swimmer's criticism of the final offer technique is, 
«that in many situations final offer arbitration merely substitutes an inter-
temporal compromise for a static (one period) compromise. If the final step 
in the procédure is reached in one wage round, there is a strong probability 
that negotiations will go to the final step in subséquent wage rounds, with 
the arbitrator's sélection flipping from one side to the other between wage 
rounds. The benefits of final-offer arbitration may be illusory.»9 
The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with some 
further évidence from the realm of professional baseball in regard to 
the latter criticism of the final offer procédure. It is hoped that thèse 
remarks will enable the reader to evaluate this assessment on its merits. 
INTERTEMPORAL COMPROMISE: THE IDEA 
The essential notion expounded by Swimmer is that arbitrators, 
constrained by the procédure to choose either the final position of 
management or labor in any one wage round, will replace their désire 
to effectuate a compromise solution in one wage round by compromising 
between wage rounds. If the above is indeed true, then we should 
observe a «flip-flop» phenomenon, where arbitrators' sélections regular-
ly change from one side to the other between wage rounds. To sub-
stantiate the existence of such a « flip-flop effect, » Swimmer provides 
évidence on the University of Alberta expérience with three consécutive 
years of usage of final offer arbitration to résolve impasses over cost 
of living wage adjustments. In support of Swimmer's hypothesis, the 
awards handed down in thèse three rounds did flip from one side's 
position to the other between rounds.10 Based on thèse three obser-
vations, Swimmer concludes that intertemporal compromises are occur-
7
 Charles FEIGENBAUM, «Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory Than 
Practice,» Industrial Relations, XIV (October, 1975), pp. 311-317. A good review of 
thèse and other criticisms of the final offer procédure can be found in Nels NELSON, 
«Final Offer Arbitration,» The Arbitration Journal, XXX (March, 1975), pp. 50-58; 
FEUILLE, op. cit. pp. 13-14 and Arnold ZACK, «Final Offer Arbitration — Panacea 
or Pandora's Box?» New York Law Forum, Winter 1974, pp. 567-585. 
8
 WITNEY, op. cit., pp. 20-25. 
9
 Gène SWIMMER, «Final Position Arbitration and Intertemporal Com-
promise: The University of Alberta Compromise,» Relations Industrielles, XXX (July, 
1975), pp. 533-536. 
10
 SWIMMER, Ibid., p. 534-536. 
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ing and that the supposed .benefits of final offer arbitration may be 
misconstrued. 
INTERTEMPORAL COMPROMISE: THE EVIDENCE 
In order to more fully explore the hypothesis of intertemporal 
compromise, it is possible to review the expérience of professional 
baseball with final offer arbitration.11 The crucial questions raised by 
Swimmer which will be commented upon are : 
1. Is there a strong probability that arbitration will be used in 
subséquent wage rounds after the procédure is used initially ? 
2. Does the «flip-flop effect» occur, and if so, is it because of 
reasons suggested by Swimmer or because arbitrators are 
choosing the most reasonable final position presented to them? 
and 
3. Does the University of Alberta expérience provide évidence 
to suggest that the benefits of final offer arbitration are il-
lusory ? 
The suggestion by Swimmer that an initial resort to final offer 
arbitration implies «... a strong probability that negotiations will go to 
the final step in subséquent wage rounds,12» in essence, hypothesizes 
a strong « narcotic » or « chilling » effect on bargaining of the final offer 
arbitration procédure. As reported earlier, one of the key perceived 
defects with conventional arbitration which led to the proposai of the 
final offer technique, was this deleterious effect on the bargaining pro-
cess. Swimmer argues that the same defect applies in the case of final 
offer arbitration. Assuming that negotiated settlements are highly 
préférable to agreements imposed by a third party, what additional 
évidence can the data from professional baseball's expérience with final 
offer arbitration provide?13 
The data show that approximately 500 players were eligible to 
make use of final offer arbitration in 1974 and again in 1975. Only four 
11
 Additionally, one could review the expériences of three public sector labor 
relations Systems in the United States with the use of final offer arbitration (specifical-
ly, Eugène, Oregon: Michigan and Wisconsin). However, thèse Systems hâve been 
studied and reported in the literature (see the citations in footnote number 6) and thus 
will not be addressed in the body of this paper. 
12
 SWIMMER, op. cit., p. 534. 
13
 Professional baseball's salary arbitration System has been described elsewhere. 
See DWORKIN, op. cit. 
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percent of the eligible pool were actually involved in arbitration pro-
ceedings in thèse two years. Twenty-eight awards were made in 1974 
and only fourteen were rendered in 1975. More importantly, only six 
of the twenty-eight players who used arbitration in 1974 chose to re-use 
arbitration in 1975.14 
At this point, it is informative to delve deeper into the central 
thème of Swimmer's comment (i.e., the existence of the «flip-flop 
effect») by analyzing the cases of the six players who made use of 
arbitration in both 1974 and 1975. Table 1 présents data relevant to 
TABLE 1 
Arbitration and Intertemporal Compromise 
Player * Year Previous Year's Salary Final Demand Final Offer Arbitration Award 
Fingers 1974 48,000 65,000 55,000 65,000 
Holtzman 1974 66,500 93,000 80,000 93,000 
Bando 1974 60,000 100,000 75,000 100,000 
Braun 1974 18,000 31,000 25,000 31,000 
Jackson 1974 75,000 135,000 100,000 135,000 
Kubiak 1974 30,000 42,500 37,000 37,000 
Fingers 1975 65,000 89,000 75,000 89,000 
Holtzman 1975 93,000 112,000 93,000 93,000 
Bando 1975 100,000 125,000 100,000 100,000 
Braun 1975 31,000 41,000 36,000 36,000 
Jackson 1975 135,000 168,500 140,000 140,000 
Kubiak 1975 37,000 
that Fingers and 
47,500 42,000 
Holtzman are pitchers and that 
47,500 
* Note Bando, Braun, 
Jackson and Kubiak are non-pitchers. 
Sources: New York Times, March 3, 1974; Business Week, March 23, 1974; 
U.S. News and World Report, March 24, 1975; Sports lllustrated, April 7, 1975. 
thèse six players. Thèse data reveal that only one player (Fingers) 
was able to win his case at arbitration in two consécutive years. Ail 
other 1974 winners (Holtzman, Bando, Braun and Jackson) were losers 
in 1975. Additionally, the only player of thèse six to lose at arbitration 
in 1974 (Kubiak) was able to win at arbitration in the following year. 
14
 DWORKIN, op. cit., p. 5 lists seven différent tests of the impact of final 
offer arbitration on bargaining. Space limitations preclude the enumeration of thèse hère, 
but, suffice it to say that the évidence throughout suggests that the vast majority 
of salary negotiations in professional baseball are completed at the bargaining table and 
without the need for arbitration. 
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One is tempted to regard thèse observations as further évidence in 
support of Swimmer's notion of intertemporal compromise by arbi-
trators. However, the figures merit a closer look ! The key question to 
answer is whether arbitrators make their décisions on the basis of the 
most reasonable final position or, as Swimmer suggests, to minimize 
the risk of alienating management, that is «... making them 'losers' two 
years in a row, ... he would not hâve been considered again as an ac-
ceptable sélection officer by the ASSUA.»15 Tables II and III présent 
performance data on the pitchers and non-pitchers who used arbitration 
TABLE 2 
Comparative Performance Statistics of Pitchers 1973-1974 
Games I.P. E.R.A. S.O. 
Player 1973 1974 1973 1974 1973 1974 1973 1974 
Fingers 62 76 127 119 1.91 2.65 110 95 
Holtzman 40 39 297 255 2.97 3.07 157 117 
Walks W.L.P. 
1973 1974 1973 1974 
39 29 .467 .643 
66 51 .618 .528 
Note : Games = Number of games appeared in ; 
I.P. = Total number of innings pitched; 
E.R.A. = Earned run average (total earned runs/total innings pitched); 
S.O. = Total number of strike outs ; 
Walks = Total number of walks ; and 
W.L.P. = Won-Lost percentage (total wins/total décisions). 
Sources: The Baseball Guide, The Baseball Encyclopedia, and various issues of The 
Sporting News. 
TABLE 3 
Comparative Performance Statistics of Non-Pitchers 1973-1974 
B.A. H.R. 
Player 1973 1974 1973 1974 
Bando .287 .243 29 22 
Braun .283 .280 6 8 
Jackson .293 .289 32 29 
Kubiak .220 .209 3 0 
Note : B.A. = Batting Average ; 
H.R. = H o m e R u n s ; 
R.B.I. = Runs Batted In; 
Runs = Runs Scored ; 
Hits = Total Hits ; and 
FIE = Fielding Percentage. 
Sources: Same as listed in Table II 
R.B.I. Runs Hits FIE 
98 103 97 84 170 121 .949 .946 
42 40 46 53 102 127 .942 .953 
117 93 99 90 158 146 .971 .968 
17 18 15 22 40 46 .974 .981 
15
 SWIMMER, op. cit., p. 535. 
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twice, respectively.16 While the small number of observations involved 
prevents the making of any strong conclusions, nevertheless, the data in 
thèse tables reveal some interesting facts.17 First, for pitchers, the 
évidence across performance catégories is mixed. On the whole, how-
ever, it seems reasonable to classify Fingers as having a «better» 
performance record in 1974 than in 1973 and to reach the opposite 
conclusion for Holtzman. For non-pitchers, the évidence is more 
straightforward. Each of the non-pitchers exhibited relatively worse 
performance in 1974 as compared with 1973, according to thèse crude 
measures. For example, Bando performed relatively worse in 1974 com-
pared to 1973 in every category except one. Table IV présents évidence 
TABLE 4 
Evidence on the Reasonableness of the 
Final Positions of the Parties in 1975' 
Evaluation of 
Performance 
in 1974 
Final Demand Final Offer Relative to Final Demand Final Offer 
Player 1974 1974 19732 1975 1975 
Fingers 35%* 14% Better 37%* 15% 
Hotzman 40 * 20 * Worse 20 * 0 * 
Bando 66 * 25 * Worse 25 * 0 * 
Braun 72 * 39 Worse 32 16 * 
Jackson 80 * 33 Worse 25 4 * 
Kubiak 41 12 * Worse 27 * 12 
* Arbitration Award 
1
 Ail figures are expressed in terms of percentage of increase over salary 
received in the previous season. 
2
 See Table II and III for détails. 
16
 For a list of the permissable arguments at the actual arbitration hearing, 
see Basic Agreement Between the .American League of Professional Baseball Clubs 
and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major League Baseball 
Players Association, Article V, Section D, part (10), p. 8. Individual player performance 
measures in the previous season are relied upon by both players and clubs in presenting 
their respective cases. 
17
 It should be noted that while the total number of final offer arbitration 
cases in professional baseball is small (n = 42), other studies of the final offer technique 
in other labor relations Systems hâve proceeded with even fewer observations. For 
example, Swimmer's work is based on three observations, while Long and Feuille hâve 
nine observations for their study of the final offer System in Eugène, Oregon. Likewise, 
studies of final offer arbitration in both Michigan and Wisconsin are made based on 
fewer total awards than those handed down in professional baseball. Thus, the findings 
of this study are based on the most extensive expérience to date with the use of 
final offer arbitration. 
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to compare thèse measures of overall performance with «reasonable-
ness» of the final demands and offers submitted at arbitration in 1975. 
The most interesting finding is that in every case, the final positions 
of the parties in 1975 were more reasonable compared with the 1974 
final positions, based upon performance changes. For example, Reggie 
Jackson clearly had a poorer season in 1974 as compared to 1973. At 
arbitration, this performance différence was reflected both in his final 
salary demand (25 percent as compared to 80 percent) and in the Club's 
final salary offer (4 percent as compared to 33 percent). The overall 
indication is that arbitrators had to choose between two final positions, 
each of which was more moderate than in the previous season. 
Finally, a few comments are in order regarding the University of 
Alberta's expérience with final offer arbitration. While it is true that the 
awards «flip-flopped» for three years, it is certainly not clear that this 
occurence was based on a désire to compromise on the part of the 
arbitrators involved. One might just as easily argue that in each case, 
the arbitrator chose the most reasonable of the final positions present-
ed to him. In fact, the data tend to bear out this alternate explanation. 
It seems that in 1971, even though the cost of living rose 4.5 percent, 
the arbitrator chose the more reasonable final position of the Board of 
Governors.18 The 1972 award, favoring the ASSUA, similarly seems to 
reflect the more reasonable of the final positions. The Association's 
demand of 5.3 percent reflected an increase equal to the cost of living 
increase. One could argue that, having fallen behind in the previous 
year, the Association could rightly demand to catch-up for the previous 
year's déficit as well as to be compensated for this year's cost of living 
increases. Viewed in this light and against the Board of Governors final 
offer of 4 percent (which would represent yet a second net decrease 
in purchasing power in as many years), did the arbitrator really invoke 
an intertemporal compromise, or was the most reasonable final position 
chosen? One could likewise argue that, based upon the critical financial 
situation facing the University in the following year, the arbitrator 
again chose the more reasonable of the final positions in the 1973 round. 
More importantly, in each of the wage rounds, the arbitrator was forced 
to choose the most reasonable of two quite moderate positions. In no 
18
 SWIMMER, op. cit., p. 534, reports that in 1971, the parties were originally 
able to negotiate a 4.5% increase, subject to the receipt of a provincial grant to the 
University which was close to a mutually agreed upon projection. When the Alberta 
grand feel short, the previous agreement was nullified and negotiations resumed. The 
Board of Governors reduced their offer to an increase of 3.14%, based on this un-
foreseen fiscal crisis. 
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instance was there any indication of the failure of the final offer pro-
cédure to produce genuinely reasonable final offers and demands. The 
essential notion is that the data are subject to several interprétations, 
only one of which is consistent with Swimmer's hypothesis. The weight 
of évidence from this study favors the conclusion that arbitrators make 
their décisions based upon the most reasonable final position put before 
them. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As more and more public and private sector labor relations 
Systems in Canada and the United States experiment with various types 
of impasse resolution mechanisms such as final offer arbitration, it is 
imperative that thèse techniques be criticized and evaluated as public 
policy alternatives. Final offer arbitration, although still in its infancy, 
seems to be an attractive alternative. Knowing how it is designed to 
work, several researchers hâve focused on selected expériences and 
outcomes under assorted final offer procédures to evaluate how the 
concept has worked in practice. One such assessment by Swimmer19 
has prompted a new criticism of the final offer technique, namely, 
that it tempts arbitrators to compromise over time and thus encourages 
the party that lost at arbitration in the previous round to re-use arbi-
tration in the next round in the hope of winning. This sort of inter-
temporal compromise with its associated flipping of awards from one 
side to the other between wage rounds implies that final offer arbitration 
does not increase the likelihood of real collective bargaining and in 
fact may increase the prevalence of arbitrated settlements when com-
pared to conventional compulsory arbitration. In order to better evaluate 
the above criticisms, this study has attempted to provide further évi-
dence from the realm of professional baseball and to re-evaluate the 
University of Alberta expérience with the final offer procédure. The 
major findings of this study are as follows : 
1. The available évidence from baseball does not seem to suggest 
a strong probability that final offer arbitration will be used in 
subséquent wage rounds after the procédure has been used 
initially. Only six players (five of whom were members of 
the Oakland Athletics Professional Baseball Club) out of 
twenty-eight who used arbitration in 1974 made use of the 
process again in 1975. The other twenty-players (nine who had 
19
 SWIMMER, op. cit., pp. 533-536. 
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won their cases in 1974 and thirteen who had lost) were able 
to reach negotiated wage settlements in 1975. Thèse figures 
suggest that final offer arbitration does not hâve a « narcotic » 
effect on bargaining in professional baseball ; 
2. In addition, Swimmer's notion that the losing party in any 
particular year will be the one to seek arbitration in the next 
round has little support in the case of professional baseball. 
Even though either side may choose to invoke arbitration, 
in every case it was the player who exercised this option. 
Recall that five out of the six players who made use of arbi-
tration twice won their cases in the year 1974. Thus, except 
for one case, it was the party who had won at arbitration 
in the previous year who actually chose to go to arbitration 
again ; 
3. The «flip-flop effect» did occur for five out of the six players 
who made use of arbitration in both 1974 and 1975. However, 
the performance data provided suggests that arbitrators made 
their décisions based upon the most reasonable final position 
put before them and not to minimize aliénation of the parties 
or maximize the probability of being selected as an arbitrator 
in the future ; and 
4. The University of Alberta expérience itself is viewed as an 
example of the successful functioning of the final offer pro-
cédure. Even though the process was used for three con-
sécutive years, the overall purpose of forcing the parties 
themselves to compromise was served. Both sides made rea-
sonable demands and the arbitrator penalized the side which 
was least reasonable by selecting the final position of the other 
party. 
The notion that arbitrators hâve some réservations about the 
efficacy of the final offer process is clearly demonstrated in the lite-
rature.20 It seems likely that arbitrators would prefer a process which 
allows them to render a compromise award over one where awards 
can easily be identified with one side or the other.21 Given the static 
20
 For example, see Joseph R. GRODIN, «Either-or Arbitration for Public 
Employée Disputes,» Industrial Relations, XI (May, 1972), pp. 260-266 and WITNEY, 
op. cit., pp. 20-25. 
21
 See Byron E. CALAME, «Best Offer Arbitration's Critics,» Wall Street 
Journal, June 14, 1972, editorial. 
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constraints imposed upon them by the final offer System, it is postulated 
by Swimmer that this désire not to alienate the participants is effec-
tuated through intertemporal compromise, a phenomenon which would 
certainly defeat the very purpose for which final offer arbitration was 
created. This is a serious potential defect which merits close évaluation. 
The results of this study indicate that intertemporal compromise is not 
a major problem and that the final offer procédure has successfully 
achieved the goal it was designed to accomplish, agreements being 
reached at the bargaining table and without the need for arbitration. 
L'arbitrage des propositions finales et les compromis annuels 
La plus récente critique de l'arbitrage des propositions finales, exposée par 
Swimmer, allègue que les arbitres, au lieu de recourir à une solution de compromis 
au cours d'une ronde de négociations font des compromis entre deux ou plusieurs ron-
des de négociations. En d'autres termes, étant donné qu'ils sont forcés par le système 
de choisir l'offre finale de l'employeur ou celle du syndicat dans chaque ronde de 
négociations, leur choix «saute» d'une partie à l'autre d'une ronde de négociations à 
l'autre. Si ce qui précède est vrai, il nous faut considérer cette façon d'agir comme si 
les arbitres cherchaient à atténuer l'effet d'aliénation et à s'assurer la probabilité d'être 
choisis de nouveau à l'avenir. Pour justifier son opinion, Swimmer se fonde sur l'ex-
périence de l'université de l'Alberta où, pendant trois années consécutives, on a eu 
recours à l'arbitrage des propositions finales pour résoudre un conflit relatif à l'ajuste-
ment des traitements en regard de la hausse du coût de la vie. À l'appui de l'hypothèse 
de Swimmer, les décisions arbitrales ont ainsi «sauté» de la position d'une partie à 
celle de l'autre partie d'une ronde de négociations à l'autre. S'appuyant sur ces trois 
observations, Swimmer tire la conclusion que de telles situations se produisant, il peut 
s'ensuivre une interprétation fausse des avantages de l'arbitrage des propositions fina-
les. 
Le but de l'article précédent est de soumettre cette hypothèse de Swimmer à 
une investigation plus approfondie tirée de l'expérience de l'arbitrage des propositions 
finales dans le domaine du baseball professionnel. Les statistiques permettent d'en 
arriver aux conclusions suivantes : 
1° La démonstration tirée du baseball ne semble pas indiquer une forte proba-
bilité que l'on recourra à l'arbitrage des propositions finales dans les rondes suivantes 
de négociation après qu'on a utilisé ce mécanisme une première fois. Six joueurs 
seulement (dont cinq faisaient partie des Athlétiques d'Oakland) sur vingt-huit qui 
avaient choisi ce mécanisme d'arbitrage en 1974 y ont eu recours de nouveau en 1975. 
Les vingt-deux autres (soit neuf qui avaient eu gain de cause en 1974 et treize qui 
avaient été déboutés) furent en mesure de conclure un accord en 1975. Ces statistiques 
indiquent que l'arbitrage des propositions finales n'a pas eu un effet «narcotique» 
sur les négociations dans le baseball professionnel. 
2° En outre, la conception de Swimmer selon laquelle la partie perdante dans 
une année donnée sera celle qui recherchera l'arbitrage à la ronde suivante n'a que peu 
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de valeur dans le baseball professionnel. Même si l'une et l'autre parties pouvaient 
recourir à l'arbitrage, dans chacun des cas, c'est le joueur qui a exercé cette option. 
Il faut se rappeler que cinq des six joueurs qui ont eu recours à l'arbitrage deux fois 
n'avaient pas eu gain de cause en 1974. Ainsi, à l'exception d'un cas, ce fut la partie 
qui avait eu gain l'année précédente qui a choisi de recourir de nouveau à l'arbi-
trage. 
3° L'effet de «saut» s'est produit pour cinq des six joueurs qui avaient opté 
pour l'arbitrage à la fois en 1974 et en 1975. Cependant, l'étude des données permet 
de se rendre compte que les arbitres ont fondé leur décision sur l'offre finale la plus 
raisonnable et non de façon à mitiger l'aliénation des parties et à maximaliser leurs 
chances d'être choisis de nouveau comme arbitres dans l'avenir. 
4° L'expérience de l'Université de l'Alberta peut être considérée comme un 
exemple du fonctionnement heureux du mécanisme de l'arbitrage des propositions finales. 
Même si on a eu recours à ce processus pendant trois années consécutives, le but 
principal qui est de forcer les parties à faire des compromis, fut bien servi. Les deux 
parties ont présenté des réclamations sérieuses et l'arbitre a pénalisé la partie qui s'était 
montrée le moins raisonnable en optant pour la proposition finale de l'autre partie. 
L'idée que les arbitres entretiennent certaines réserves relativement à l'efficacité 
de la formule de l'arbitrage des propositions finales ressort nettement de ce qui s'est 
écrit sur le sujet. Il semble que les arbitres préféreraient une formule qui puisse leur 
permettre de rendre une décision de compromis plutôt qu'une sentence où l'on peut les 
identifier à l'une ou à l'autre des parties. Compte tenu des contraintes qu'exerce sur 
eux la formule d'arbitrage des propositions finales, Swimmer en déduit que ce désir de 
ne pas s'aliéner les parties est atteint au moyen du compromis d'une ronde de négo-
ciations à l'autre, un phénomène qui ne pourrait qu'avoir pour effet de détourner de sa 
fin même la formule de l'arbitrage des propositions finales. Ce serait là en réalité un 
défaut qu'il importe d'évaluer sérieusement. Les résultats de l'étude précédente tendent 
à démontrer qu'il ne s'agit pas là d'un problème grave et que le régime d'arbitrage 
des propositions finales a atteint le but qu'on voulait lui voir atteindre, c'est-à-dire des 
ententes négociées sans qu'il soit besoin de recourir sans cesse à l'arbitrage. 
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